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Abstract
Depth-limited look-ahead search is an essential tool for agents playing perfect-
information games. In imperfect information games, the lack of a clear notion
of a value of a state makes designing theoretically sound depth-limited solving
algorithms substantially more difficult. Furthermore, most results in this direction
only consider the domain of poker. We consider two-player zero-sum extensive
form games in general. We provide a domain-independent definitions of optimal
value functions and prove that they can be used for depth-limited look-ahead game
solving. We prove that the minimal set of game states necessary to define the value
functions is related to common knowledge of the players. We show the value
function may be defined in several structurally different ways. None of them is
unique, but the set of possible outputs is convex, which enables approximating the
value function by machine learning models.
1 Introduction
Depth-limited look-ahead game solving with heuristic evaluation function recently lead to beating
human professionals in go [Silver et al., 2017] and poker [Moravcˇík et al., 2017]. While for perfect
infomation games, it was a well established methodology since the very beginning [Shannon, 1950],
creating a theoretically sound depth-limited solving in imperfect-information games is substantially
more difficult. One key complication is that, in imperfect-information games, it is not possible to
define a value of a single state of a game in isolation. Instead, the value depends on the other states
that the players consider likely in a particular situation, on the states that they think their opponent
considers likely, and so on.
Existing applications of theoretically sound depth-limited look-ahead game solving are limited to
the game of poker. Depth-limited continual resolving in DeepStack [Moravcˇík et al., 2017] enabled
human-speed expert-level game play with computing resources commonly available in a commodity
laptop. Brown et al. [2018] used depth-limited solving to create a poker bot, which outperforms the
strongest submissions from Annual Computer Poker Competition and can be build form scratch on
a common desktop. Alternative approaches for creating top-performing poker bots usually require a
supercomputer [Bowling et al., 2015; Brown and Sandholm, 2017].
This success of depth-limited game solving in an imperfect-information game has never been repli-
cated beyond the Texas hold’em poker domain. Texas hold’em has a very particular structure of
the available information. After the initial cards are dealt, all the following actions of the play-
ers, as well as chance, are pefectly observable. As a result, the amount of hidden information is
constant throughout the game. Furthermore, since the players’ moves alternate, it is always clear
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how many actions has each player performed. However, the standard extensive-form game (EFG)
framework describes many games which do not enjoy these properties. For example, in blind chess
[Ciancarini and Favini, 2010], we may learn we lost a piece, but not necessarily which opponent’s
piece took it. In visibility-based pursuit-evasion [Raboin et al., 2010], we know the opponent stayed
hidden, but not in which direction they moved. In phantom games [Teytaud and Teytaud, 2011], we
may learn it is our turn to play, but not how many illegal moves has the opponent attempted.
Heuristic evaluation function used in DeepStack has been defined in poker terms. The input is the
probability of each player holding distinct pairs of cards in their hand in the evaluated situation;
the output is the expected number of chips a player can win with their cards if the player played to
reach the evaluated situation. It is not clear how to generalize this definition to other games, or even
whether the value function they approximate is well-defined.
In this paper, we define value functions analogous the DeepStack’s heuristic evaluation for arbitrary
extensive form game. We formally prove that the minimal set of game states necessary to define the
value corresponds to the common knowledge of the players. Furthermore, we prove several proper-
ties of the value functions, which are useful for their approximation using machine learning models.
We show that the inputs and outputs of the value functions may be represented in several ways with
different structure. None of the input-output mappings is unique, hence, the value functions are,
strictly speaking, not always functions. However, this is not a fundamental problem, because the
possible outputs form a convex set where any element is a suitable output for depth-limited solving.
2 Background
In this section, we recall the standard EFG model and the more recent notions of augmented infor-
mation sets, public states, and subgames.
2.1 Extensive-form games
We focus on two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with imperfect information. Based
on [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994], gameG can be described by
• H – the set of histories, representing sequences of actions.
• Z – the set of terminal histories (those z ∈ H which are not a prefix of any other history).
We use g ⊏ h to denote the fact that g is equal to or a prefix of h, and extend this notation
to subsets ofH as A ⊏ B ⇐⇒ (∃g ∈ A)(∃h ∈ B) : g ⊏ h.
• For a non-terminal history h ∈ H \ Z , A(h) := {a | ha ∈ H} is the set of actions
available at a .
• N = {1, . . . , N} is the player set, where c is a special player, called “chance” or “nature”.
• P : H \ Z → N ∪ {c} is the player function partitioning non-terminal histories into Hp,
p = 1, . . . , N, c depending on which player acts at h.
• The strategy of chance is a fixed probability distribution σc over actions inHc.
• The utility function u = (up)p∈N assigns to each terminal history z a reward up(z) ∈ R
received by each player upon reaching z.
• The information-partition I = (Ip)p∈N captures the imperfect information of G. For
each player, Ip is a partition of Hp. If g, h ∈ Hi belong to the same I ∈ Ip then p cannot
distinguish between them. For each I ∈ Ip, the available actions A(h) are the same for
each h ∈ I , and we overloadA(·) asA(I) := A(h). We only consider games with perfect
recall, where the players remember their past actions and the information sets visited so
far.
We focus on two-player zero-sum games, where N = {1, 2} and u2 = −u1. However, this
assumption is only truly necessary for results related to optimal game values (Section 5).
A behavioral strategy σp ∈ Σp of player p assigns to each I ∈ Ip a probability distribution σp(I)
over available actions a ∈ A(I). A tuple σ = (σp)p∈N is called a strategy profile.
The expected utility for player i of a strategy profile σ is up(σ) := Ez∼σ up(z). The profile
σ is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium if the benefit of switching to some alternative σ′p is limited by ǫ, i.e.,
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∀i ∈ N : maxσ′p∈Σp up(σ
′
p, σ−p)−up(σ) ≤ ǫ. When ǫ = 0, the profile is called a Nash equilibrium.
It is a standard result that in two-player zero-sum games, all σ∗ ∈ NE have the same up(σ∗). The
exploitability expl(σ) of σ ∈ Σ is the average of exploitabilities expli(σp), p = 1, 2, where
explp(σp) := up(σ
∗)− min
σ−p∈Σ−p
up(σp, σ−p).
2.2 Augmented information sets and subgames
To speak about the information available to player i in histories where he doesn’t act, we will use the
augmented sets Iaugp introduced in [Burch et al., 2014].1 For p ∈ N and h ∈ H \ Z , we define the
p’s observation-action history ~Op(h) in h as the sequence (I1, a1, I2, a2, . . . ) of the information sets
visited and actions taken by p on the path to h (incl. I ∋ h if h ∈ Hp). Two histories g, h ∈ H \ Z
belong to the same augmented information set I ∈ Iaugp if ~Op(g) = ~Op(h). Clearly I
aug
p coincides
with Ip onHp. We assume all information gets revealed at the end of the game, and thus I
aug
p ∋ {z}
for each z ∈ Z . For I, J ∈ Iaugp , we define I ⊏ J ⇐⇒ ∃g ∈ I, h ∈ J : g ⊏ h.
Remark 1 (Thick information sets). [Šustr et al., 2019] note that in general EFGs, augmented infor-
mation sets can be “thick” – i.e. they can contain both some h ∈ H and it’s parent g 6= h. Since it is
straightforward to circumvent this issue by only considering the upper frontier ([Halpern and Pass,
2016; Halpern, 1997]) of each I , we ignore the issue by assuming none of the discussed domains
contains thick augmented information sets.
Public states are super-sets of elements of Iaugp that capture the information that everybody knows:
Definition 2. Let g ∼ h
def.
⇐⇒ ~O1(g) = ~O1(h) ∨ · · · ∨ ~ON (g) = ~ON (h). A public tree is any
partition S ofH that forms a tree and is closed under∼. Its elements are called public states.
Using the concept of public states, [Šustr et al., 2019] define a subgame in EFGs as follows.
Definition 3. A subgame G(S) rooted at a public state S ∈ S is the set {h ∈ H| ∃g ∈ S : g ⊏ h}.
3 Revisiting reach probabilities and values
In this section, we take a closer look at reach probabilities, list particularly useful versions of this
concept, and use them to give several equivalent definitions of the notion of range. We also clarify
the properties of and the relationship between expected utilities and counterfactual values.
3.1 Reach probabilities
We start by introducing the notation related to reach probabilities in EFGs. The reach probability
of a history h ∈ H under a strategy σ is defined as ησ(h) the product of probabilities of taking
each action between the root and h. The counterfactual reach probability ησ−p(h) is defined anal-
ogously, except that player p now aims to reach h, so the probabilities of his actions are replaced by
1. Finally, player p’s reach probability ησp (h) is the probability that they will play to reach h, i.e.
the quantity missing in ησ−p(h) (so we have η
σ(h) = ησp (h)η
σ
−p(h)).
We now extend this notation to Iaugp . Note that naively defining ησ(·)(A) :=
∑
h∈A η
σ
(·)(h) for general
A ⊂ H, such as ησp (I) for an information set I not belonging to p, will often result in “reach
probabilities” that behave nothing like actual probabilities (e.g. having values over 1).
The non-problematic part is the (counterfactual) probability of reaching I ∈ Iaugp , which we simply
denote as ησ(I) :=
∑
h∈I η
σ(h), resp. ησ−p(I) :=
∑
h∈I η
σ
−p(h). Some care needs to be taken
with ησp (I): rather than defining it as the sum over h ∈ I , we set η
σ
p (I) := η
σ
p (hI), where hI ∈ I
is chosen arbitrarily (since I ∈ Iaugp , ησp (h) is the same for all h ∈ I). This ensures that η
σ(I) =
ησ−p(I)η
σ
p (I).
1However, our results would still hold if we replaced Iaugp by a different “augmented information partition”,
i.e. a partition Jp of H which coincides with Ip on Hp and for which (Jp,⊏) forms a (topological) tree w.r.t.
the partial order I ⊏ J ⇐⇒ ∃g ∈ I, h ∈ J : g ⊏ h.
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For g ⊏ h, ησ(·)(g, h) denotes the probability of reaching h conditional on already being in g. We
compute it analogously to ησ(·)(h), except that we only take the product of probabilities of actions
between g and h. For h ∈ I ⊏ J (where I, J ∈ Iaugp ) we define the conditional reach probabilities
as ησ(·)(I, J) := η
σ
(·)(J)/η
σ
(·)(I) and denote
ησ(h|I) :=
ησ(h)
ησ(I)
=
ησ−p(h)
ησ−p(I)
=: ησ−p(h|I). (1)
While the denominator in ησ(·)(I, J) and (1) can be 0, we can extend both notions even to unreachable
I (Section A.1).
3.2 Range in general imperfect information games
In poker, range can be (informally and ambiguously) defined as “the likelihood of having vari-
ous private cards in a given situation”. However, a useful formalization of this concept isn’t ob-
vious, in particular in EFGs other than poker. One option would be to set “range of p at S :=
(ησ(I)/ησ(S))I∈Iaugp (S)” – in other words, “the probability of being in each I , conditional on be-
ing in the current public state”. However, this definition depends on the strategy of the opponent,
and thus a player wouldn’t know their own range. (Indeed, just consider the difference between an
opponent who plays randomly and an opponent who will always fold unless he is holding two aces.)
Proposition 4 (Equivalent definitions of range). With the knowledge of σ1 and the game rules, we
can calculate the following range-like variables for S ∈ S ((4) and (5) are two-player games only):
(1) ησ1 (I) for I ∈ I
aug
1 (S)) (information set reach probabilities for player 1),
(2) ησ1 (h) for h ∈ S (history reach probabilities for player 1),
(3) ησ1 (h) and η
σ
c (h) for h ∈ S (history reach probabilities for player 1 and chance),
(4) ησ−2(J) for J ∈ I
aug
2 (S) (the opponent’s counterfactual reach probabilities),
(5) ησ(h|J) for h ∈ J ∈ Iaug2 (S) (conditional probabilities for the opponent’s information sets).
If we forget σ1, any of the lines (1)-(3) can be used to recover (1)-(5) via a simple calculation.
Proof. The “derivations” (3) → (2) → (1) and (1) → (2) are trivial, since ησ1 (I) is defined as
ησ1 (hI) for arbitrary choice of hI ∈ I (and η
σ
1 (h) is the same for all h ∈ I ∈ I
aug
1 ). η
σ
c (h) can always
be recovered from the rules of the game, which gives (2)→ (3). (3)→ (4) holds because ησ−2(J) =∑
h∈J η
σ
c (h)η
σ
1 (h). (3)→ (5) holds because η
σ(h|J) = ησ(h)/ησ(J) = ησ−2(h)/η
σ
−2(J).
The corollary of Proposition 4 is that among (1)-(3), we are free to use whichever option suits us the
best — (3) is the most descriptive, while (1) requires the least space to store. This becomes relevant
for example when using range as an input for a neural network.
Definition 5 (Range). For σ ∈ Σ, rngσ(S) := ( ησ1 (h), η
σ
2 (h), ηc(h) )S and (π
σ(h))S denote the
separated and joint range at S. The compact representation of a range is the tuple
(
ησp (I)
)
I∈Iaugp (S)
for p ∈ N .
3.3 Values of non-optimal strategies
We now define standard and counterfactual values for a given, typically sub-optimal, strategy. We
start with histories and history-action pairs and, since the players cannot observe histories directly,
proceed by extending the notation to augmented information sets and action-infoset pairs. We then
list the properties of these values. The use of letters v and q is inspired by and consistent with
[Srinivasan et al., 2018] and (apart from using capital letters to differentiate between values of infos-
ets and histories).
Player p’s value of the history h ∈ H under σ ∈ Σ is the expected utility conditional on visiting h:
vσp (h) :=Ez∼σ [up(z) | h reached] =
∑
z⊐h
ησ(h, z)up(z).
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Analogously, we define the value of an action a ∈ Ap(h) taken at h ∈ Hp under σ:
qσp (h, a) := Ez∼σ [ui(z) | h reached, a taken] =
∑
z⊐ha
ησ(ha, z)ui(z).
As in MDPs, we have vσp (h) :=
∑
a∈Ap(h)
σp(h, a)q
σ
p (h, a). A very useful variant of these concepts
are the counterfactual values [Zinkevich et al., 2008], defined as vσp,c(h) := η
σ
−p(h)v
σ
p (h) and
qσp,c(h) := η
σ
−p(h)q
σ
p (h, a).
To extend the notation for I ∈ Iaugp , we define V σp (I) as the weighted average of v
σ
p (h), h ∈ I:
V σp (I) := Ez∼σ [ui(z) | I reached] =
∑
h∈I
ησ(h|I)vσp (h).
We define V σp,c(I) := η
σ
−p(I)V
σ
p (I). The Q-valuesQ
σ
p (I, a) andQ
σ
p,c(I, a) are defined analogously
and satisfy V σp (I) =
∑
a∈Ap(I)
σp(I, a)Q
σ
p (I, a) and V
σ
p,c(I) =
∑
a∈Ap(I)
σp(I, a)Q
σ
p,c(I, a).
4 Motivation: depth-limited solving in imperfect information games
We now describe the CFR algorithm, recall two depth-limited solving algorithms that build on top
of it, and discuss their connection to the present paper. For a strategy σ ∈ Σ, I ∈ Ii and a ∈ A(I),
we define the counterfactual regret for not playing a in I under σ as
rσp (I, a) := Q
σ
i,c(I, a)− V
σ
i,c(I) (2)
and define the corresponding (cumulative) immediate counterfactual regret as
R¯Ti,imm(I) := max
a∈A(I)
R¯Ti,imm(I, a) := max
a∈A(I)
1
T
T∑
t=1
rσ
t
p (I, a).
The Counterfactual Regret minimization (CFR) algorithm [Zinkevich et al., 2008] works by inde-
pendently minimizing R¯Ti,imm(I) at each I ∈ I. Its average strategy σ¯
T provably converges to a NE
[Lanctot et al., 2009, Theorem 1]. CFR usually traverses the whole game tree in depth-first search
in each iteration. On the way from the root to leafs, it computes the reach probabilities of individual
players and on the way back, it computes the expected utilities and updates the regrets.
CFR-D [Burch et al., 2014] is a “decomposition” variant of CFR that computes the NE strategy for
only a limited number of first moves in the game, called trunk. In each iteration, it (I) computes
the reach probabilities at the end of the trunk, (II) computes the Nash equilibrium in each subgame
rooted at the bottom of the trunk given the fixed reach probabilities, (III) computes counterfactual
best response values in the root of the subgame (w.r.t the trunk strategy extended by the subgame
NE), and (IV) uses the values from (III) to update the regrets and strategy in the trunk via CFR.
Suppose that µ is a strategy defined in a trunk T ⊂ H. The standard variant of CFR-D solves each
subgame G(S, rngµ(S)) at the bottom of T using CFR, this subgame-solving part of the algorithm
(SubgameValues method, [Burch, 2017, Section 5.3.1]) can be instantiated by any mapping νp :
Ip(S)→ R for which
(∃σ ∈ Σ, rngσ(S) = r) : σ|G(S) is a NE in G(S, r) & νp(I) = max
σ′p
V
σ′p,σ−p
p,c (I). (3)
Eventually, one might wish to use a depth-limited solver that is more scaleable than CFR-D: Contin-
ual resolving [Moravcˇík et al., 2017; Šustr et al., 2019] utilizes the same decomposition principle
as CFR-D, but it adds the option to start the search not just from the root, but rather from any public
state. DeepStack [Moravcˇík et al., 2017] is a poker-specific instance of CR. To solve subgames, it
uses a neural network trained on a large number of sample subgame solutions.
5 Optimal Value functions in zero-sum games
While the previous section already describes the notion of value of a specific strategy, depth-limited
solving requires the notion of “what would happen if we played this strategy for the next few moves
and then started playing optimally”. To investigate this stronger notion of a value, we restrict our
attention to two-player zero-sum EFGs.
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5.1 The definition of optimal values
We first define a set of strategies that are compatible with what has happened in the game so far
and “optimal” for the upcoming decisions. To get a robust notion of an optimal value, we focus
on strategies that not only find the NE of the current subgame, but also play optimally even in the
whole root of the game (even its unreachable parts). It suffices to use a slightly relaxed version of
“subgame perfection”, where the strategy
Definition 6 (Compatible root-optimal strategy). Let r be a range at S ∈ S. By CROS(S, r) we de-
note the set of strategies σ ∈ Σ that satisfy rngσ(S) = r and for which V σp (I) = max{V
σ′p,σ−p
p (I) |
σ′p ∈ Σp} holds for each I ∈ I
aug
p (S), p = 1, 2.
By G(S, r) we denote the “unsafe resolving subgame” ([Burch, 2017]) obtained by taking G(S)
and turning it into a proper game by adding a chance node rootS . This root connects to each (topmost,
[Šustr et al., 2019]) h ∈ S via some action ah whose probability is proportional to ηµ(h). For fully
mixed ranges, there is a straightforward connection between CROS(S, r) andG(S, r). Lemma 7 (iii)
uses this connection to prove the existence of CROS(S, r) strategies for general r.
Lemma 7 (Properties of SOS). For every r and S, CROS(S, r) satisfies the following:
(i) The restriction σ|G(S) of any σ ∈ CROS(S, r) is a NE in G(S, r).
(ii) For fully mixed r, any NE in G(S, r) extends into a CROS(S, r) strategy.
(iii) CROS(S, r) is non-empty.
This justifies the following definition of optimal value functions:
Definition 8 (Optimal value functions). Let µ be a strategy defined in some trunk T ⊂ H. A function
V µ,∗p : S × I
aug
p → R is said to be a optimal value function for p and µ if it satisfies
(∀S ∈ S at the bottom of T ) (∃σ ∈ CROS(S, rngµ(S)))
(
∀I ∈ Iaugp
)
: V µ,∗p (S, I) = V
σ
p (I).
An optimal value function vµ,∗p : S × H → R for histories is defined analogously, replacing
V µ,∗p (S, I) = V
σ
p (I) by v
µ,∗
p (S, h) = v
σ
p (h). The optimal counterfactual value functions V
µ,∗
c,p
and vµ,∗c,p are defined analogously, adding a c subscript into the condition above.
5.2 Properties of the optimal values
Our definition coincides with other standard definitions of value: Indeed, if G is in fact also an
(acyclic) MDP (i.e. it has perfect information and no player 2 nodes), then public states coincide
with states, their optimal value is uniquely defined, and hence both V σ,∗p and v
σ,∗
p coincide with the
standard MDP state-value v∗ [Sutton and Barto, 2018] (independently of σ). If G is a two-player
zero-sum perfect-information game, then V σ,∗p and v
σ,∗
p again coincide and are equal to the minimax
value of the state. This is true even whenG admits simultaneous moves [Bošansky` et al., 2016].
These coincidences are the main reason for considering the normalized values. On the other hand,
the non-normalized values are more straightforward to compute. By Proposition 9, IS_Values can
be applied in depth-limited solving, which proves that it is indeed a useful notion of a value function:
Proposition 9 (V σ,∗c,p can be used for depth-limited solving). For every trunk strategy µ, any optimal
counterfactual value function V σ,∗c,p satisfies Equation (3).
Proof. By Definition 8, we have V σ,∗c,p (S, I) = V
σ
p,c(I) for some σ ∈ CROS. By definition of CROS,
σ has satisfies rngσ(S) = r, σ|G(S) ∈ NE(G(S, r)) and V σp (I) = maxσ′p V
σ′p,σ−p
p (I) for each
I ∈ Iaugp (S). Since V
(·)
p,c (I) = η
(·)
p (I)V
(·)
p (I), we get V σp,c(I) = maxσ′p V
σ′p,σ−p
p,c (I) as well.
To make the computation of values feasible, we use two practical tweaks: Firstly, for a fixed range,
we do not use the subgame-optimal strategies, but instead solve the subgame by CFR (w.r.t. the
counterfactual values in the whole game). A solution σ found by CFR doesn’t necessarily have the
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properties of CROS(S, r), but, in the limit, it is still good enough for depth-limited resolving (i.e.
the correspondingmapping I 7→ V σp,c(I) is optimal in the sense of Eq. (3)). Second, we approximate
the I 7→ V σp,c(I) mapping by a neural network.
Because of numerical instability, very similar ranges might correspond to very different (but still
optimal) values. The neural network will converge to a convex combination of these values. The
following result shows that both of this tweak still produce data useful for depth-limited solving.
Proposition 10 (Approximating V µ,∗c,p by a neural net). Let r be a range at S ∈ S and p ∈ {1, 2}.
If V and V ′ are two mappings satisfying Eq. (3), then so does their convex combination W =
λV + (1− λ)V ′ for any λ ∈ (0, 1).
This proves the correctness of the function-approximation step of DeepStack [Moravcˇík et al.,
2017].
Using infoset values over history values is often beneficial, not only because it reduces the dimension
of value-vector, but also because it removes some of the ambiguity:
Proposition 11 (Infoset aggregation reduces ambiguity). If σ, µ ∈ CROS(S, r) satisfy σ−p = µ−p,
then we have V σp (I) = V
µ
p (I) and V
σ
p,c(I) = V
µ
p,c(I) = V
CBRp(σ−p),σ−p
p,c (I) for each I ∈ I
aug
p (S).
In other words, the optimal infoset values are uniquely determined by the opponent’s strategy.
5.3 The rationale behind our definition
We now compare our definition of optimal value functionswith values in other models, note the ways
in which it is more complicated, and illustrate on examples why these complications are necessary.
Consider the minimax value of a history h in a perfect-information zero-sum game. This value is
uniquely defined, depends only on h (and the subgame below it), and corresponds to any-and-all NE
strategies in the subgame rooted at h. In contrast, we have made no claims about the uniqueness of
vσ,∗p (S, h), this value depends on the strategy above h, and in fact above the whole S, and requires
not just any NE, but its particular refinement. We now explain why these these complications are
necessary.
Firstly, it is possible to define a single-number value for the whole S and range as the value of
the corresponding game G(S, r). This is similar to the approach taken by [Wiggers et al., 2016] in
partially-observable stochastic games, where beliefs serve a similar purpose as ranges in EFGs. We
choose our definition partly because knowing the value of each individual history/information set
seems inherently interesting, but more importantly because unlike public-state values, these values
are sufficiently informative to enable depth-limited solving (Proposition 9).
Second, why does the definition of our values use a refinement of Nash equilibrium, and not just
any NE? We want our definition of value to capture the notion of “what would have happened,
if the game actually reached a specific history/information set?”. However, each h in the root of
G(S, r) is weighted proportionally to r(h), implying that G(S, r) effectively ignores the parts of
G(S) that have zero probability under r. To avoid distorting the values of such h, we only consider
the CROS(S, r) strategies, under which even unreachable histories in S have optimal values.
For a specific example of this behavior, see the game from Figure 2 (c): The bolded-out strategy
(L,B) is a NE, but if player 1 took this to mean that he is free to play R because the “value of
L = value of R = 1”, they would be in for an unpleasant surprise – upon reaching X , a rational
player 2 would not play the “bad” action B. Intuitively, the correct strategy is (L,G), which yields
+1
0
-1
0
0
+1
0
-1
root
g2
h2
end
g1
h1
end
I
Figure 1: A zero-sum game where different equilibria produce different expected utilities. The
utility of player 1 is the sum of the obtained rewards.
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“value of L = 1, value of R = 0”. This aligns with our definition of value, since the range at S =
{L,R} corresponding to L is (1, 0), and we have (L,G) ∈ CROS({L,R}, (1, 0)), but (L,B) /∈
CROS({L,R}, (1, 0)).
Moreover, a value of a history depends on the whole range:
Theorem 12 (Values depend on whole ranges). Let G be an EFG, S ∈ S a common-knowledge
public state2, h0 ∈ S, and r a joint range at S. Assume that S isn’t thick and r is fully mixed3. Then
for each g ∈ S, there is r′ that only differs from r at g, and an EFG G˜ which only differs from G
below S, s.t. {vσ1 (h0) | σ ∈ C˜ROS(S, r)} 6= {v
σ
1 (h0) | σ ∈ C˜ROS(S, r
′)}.
The intuition behind G˜ is that until we have understood G, we cannot be certain it doesn’t behave
like G˜. One could prove a more general version of the statement for thick S and (nearly) arbitrary r
and r′. However, we believe Theorem 12 illustrates the need for full range sufficiently. Even for a
fixed range, the value of a history might be different under different equilibrium strategies:
Example 13. CROS(S, r) strategies that have the same range can still have different history values.
This is readily witnessed by the game from Figure 1, where any player can make a trade-off between
the expected utilities at g1 and g2 (while still playing optimally).
By Proposition 11, the ambiguity of values can be reduced by aggregating values over information
sets. The game from Figure 2 (a) shows that even this aggregation doesn’t fully resolve the ambi-
guity, since the opponent can still make tradeoffs between states that he can’t tell apart, but we can
(in the depicted game, player 1 has perfect information and hence {A} and {B} are his information
sets, but different NE strategies give different values for A and B):
Example 14. Distinct CROS(S, r) strategies can, for some I ∈ Iaugp (S), have different values of I .
One could also wonder whether it perhaps doesn’t suffice to only consider ranges that correspond
to Nash equilibria, and whether these might not all lead to the same value function. When running
CFR-D, the trunk strategy will often be highly sub-optimal— in this sense, we truly do need values
even for non-optimal ranges. The game depicted in Figure 2 (b) shows that the latter property doesn’t
hold either:
Example 15. Suppose that trunk strategies σ and σ′ can both be extended into NE in the full game
and V σ,∗p is an optimal value function for σ. Then V
σ,∗
p might not be optimal for σ
′.
5.4 Multi-valued states
Multi-valued states is an approach to value estimation in imperfect-information games developed by
[Brown et al., 2018]. The authors propose to fix some equilibrium strategy σ1 and remember, for
each h whose “value” we might need, the vector of values vσ1,ν21 (h) for undominated pure strategies
ν2 of player 2 below h. The part of the game below h is replaced by a single decision where player
2The common-knowledge public states, defined by [Šustr et al., 2019] as the equivalence classes of ∼, are
public states that cannot be further split into smaller ones.
3That is, r(h) > 0 holds for each h ∈ S.
A
0 1
B
1 0 IA
IB
0 1 1 0
Pf
A
A B
PfB
A B
L
1
R
X
0 1
L R
G B
Figure 2: (a) Different NE produce different infoset values. (b) Different NE ranges lead to different
values. (c) Subgame-optimal strategy produces accurate values, an ordinary “subgame NE” doesn’t.
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2 picks ν2, and receives the corresponding utility. Section 7 of [Brown et al., 2018] contains a nice
comparison of multi-valued states and the approach of [Moravcˇík et al., 2017]. For our purposes,
the key differences are that multi-valued states are easier to learn, but require the prior knowledge
of an approximate equilibrium strategy σ1 in the full game G. This assumption is very unrealistic,
since the whole point of solving G is to find such σ1. However, the approach works well – at
least for poker – even when σ1 is sub-optimal [Brown et al., 2018]. Ultimately, both approaches
deserve further investigation, since their effectiveness might vary depending on the specific domain
and setting.
6 Conclusion
We reviewed the properties of reach probabilities and gave a definition of the notion of range that
can be applied not just in poker, but in any extensive-form game. We showed that our definition of
range is equivalent to several other range-like variables and argued against defining range intuitively
as “the probability of the real situation beingX conditional on the player seeing Y ”. We also listed
several equivalent descriptions of a value of a strategy, and contrasted this with a more complicated
notion of optimal value. We gave examples illustrating that any definition of optimal value has to
take range into account, and that even with a fixed range, optimal values don’t have to be unique.
However, any vector of optimal values can serve as a heuristic for depth-limited search in imperfect
information EFGs.
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A Appendix
A.1 Conditional reach probabilities for unreachable I
We now aim to define the conditional reach probability for I ⊏ J , I, J ∈ Iaugp . To avoid un-
defined behavior in cases when ησ(I) = 0, we define the “noisy version” of σ as σn(I, a) :=
(1 − 1
n
)σ(I, a) + 1
n
1
|A(I)| and set, for h ∈ I ∈ I
aug
p ,
ησ(h|I) := lim
n→∞
Pσn [h reached | I reached] (4)
= lim
n→∞
ησ
n
(h)
ησn(I)
= lim
n→∞
ησ
n
−p(h)
ησ
n
−p(I)
. (5)
Note that “ησ−p(h|I)” would coincide with η
σ(h|I), and ησp (h|I) wouldn’t make any sense.
Equipped by this tool, we define the reach probability of J conditional on being in I as
ησ(I, J) :=
∑
g∈I
ησ(g|I)
∑
g⊏h∈J
ησ(g, h).
The analogous definition works for ησ−p(I, J) and, denoting η
σ
p (I, J) := η
σ
p (gp, hJ) for arbitrary
choice of I ∋ gp ⊏ hJ ∈ J , leads to ησ(I, J) = ησp (I, J)η
σ
−p(I, J). When η
σ(I) > 0, these
definitions coincide with the intuitive definition ησ(·)(I, J) = η
σ
(·)(J)/η
σ
(·)(I).
Remark 16 (Properties of ησ(·|I)). While the conditional reach probability is defined as a limit, it
is straightforward to check that it can always be rewritten as one of the following cases:
• When ησ(I) > 0, ησ(h|I) is actually equal to the probability of being in h conditional of
being in I .
• When we at least have ησ−p(I) > 0, η
σ(h|I) = ησ−p(h)/η
σ
−p(I) is the same conditional
probability under the assumption that p played to reach I .
• Finally, when even ησ−p(I) is zero, η
σ(h|I) = ηrnd(h)/ηrnd(I) is equal to the same condi-
tional probability, but under the assumption that both players act (uniformly) randomly.
A.2 Properties of non-optimal value functions
The following two theorems summarize the properties of V σp and V
σ
p,c. By a slice of I
aug
p below (not
necessarily directly below) I we mean any collection SL ⊂ Iaugp s.t. (i) (∀J ∈ SL) : J ⊐ I (ii)
J ⊏ J ′ for no distinct J, J ′ ∈ Iaugp (iii) SL is a maximal set with this property. By ims(I), we
denote the set of immediate successors of I in Iaugp .
Theorem 17 (Properties of V σp ). For σ ∈ Σ, p, and V : I
aug
p → R, the following are equivalent:
(1) (∀I ∈ Iaugp ) : V (I) =
∑
h∈I η
σ(h|I)vσp (h) (and this is equal to
∑
h∈I η
σ
−p(h|I)v
σ
p (h) ),
(2) (∀z ∈ Z) : V (z) = up(z) and (∀I ∈ I
aug
p non-terminal) : V (I) =
∑
J∈ims(I) η
σ(I, J)V (J),
(3) V = V σp is the counterfactual utility from [Zinkevich et al., 2008].
Moreover, if V satisfies (1)-(3), then V (root) = up(σ), V : I
aug
p → [minZ up(z),maxZ up(z)], and
(4) (∀I ∈ Iaugp )(∀SL slice below I) : V (I) =
∑
J∈SL η
σ(I, J)V (J).
Proof. We prove the theorem for fully mixed σ. The general case follows by transition to the limit.
The “and this is equal to...” case in 1 follows from Remark 16.
(1) ⇐⇒ (3): Using the formula vσp (h) =
∑
h⊏z∈Z η
σ(h, z)up(z), we get that V (I) from (1)
is equal to
∑
h∈I
ησ
−p(h)
ησ
−p
(I)
∑
h⊏z∈Z η
σ(h, z)up(z), which is the definition used in [Zinkevich et al.,
2008].
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(1) =⇒ (2): Suppose that V satisfies 1. For terminal z, V (z) = up(z) is a special case of
V (I) =
∑
h∈I η
σ(h|I)vσp (h). We have
V (I) =
∑
h∈I
ησ(h|I)vσp (h) =
∑
h∈I
ησ(h)
ησ(I)
∑
J∈ims(I)
∑
h⊏g∈J
ησ(h, g)vσp (g)
=
∑
h∈I
∑
J∈ims(I)
∑
h⊏g∈J
ησ(J)
ησ(I)
ησ(g)
ησ(J)
vσp (g) =
∑
J∈ims(I)
ησ(I, J)
∑
g∈J
ησ(g|J)vσp (g)
=
∑
J∈ims(I)
ησ(I, J)V (J).
(2) =⇒ (1): The converse implication can be shown similarly using backward induction.
The “moreover” part: V (root) = up(σ) follows from (1) because ησ(root) = 1. V : I
aug
p →
[minZ up(z),maxZ up(z)] follows from (2) by backward induction. (4) can be derived from (1) in
the same way as (2).
The main advantage of V σp over V
σ
p,c is their easy calculation in leaves (2) and intuitive back-
propagation (4), and hence their more intuitive interpretation as “utilities expected at I”. On the
other hand, the non-normalized counterfactual values are harder to compute in leaves – cf. (2) and
(2’) – but easier to back-propagate (by (4’), their back-propagation only requires p’s reach prob-
ability). Moreover, the corresponding formula (1’) doesn’t suffer from division by 0 when I is
unreachable:
Theorem 18 (Properties of V σp,c). For σ ∈ Σ, p, and Vc : I
aug
p → R, the following are equivalent:
(1’) (∀I ∈ Iaugp ) : Vc(I) =
∑
h∈I v
σ
p,c(h) (and this is equal to
∑
h∈I η
σ
−p(h)v
σ
p (h) ),
(2’) (∀z ∈ Z) :Vc(z) = ησ−p(z)up(z) and (∀{z} 6= I ∈ I
aug
p ) : Vc(I) =
∑
J∈ims(I) η
σ
p (I, J)Vc(J),
(3’) Vc = V σp,c = η
σ
−p(·)V
σ
p is the counterfactual value from [Zinkevich et al., 2008].
Moreover, (1)-(3) implies Vc(root) = up(σ), Vc(I) ∈ [ησ−p(I)min up(z), η
σ
−p(I)max up(z)], and
(4’) (∀I ∈ Iaugp )(∀SL slice below I) : Vc(I) =
∑
J∈SL η
σ
p (I, J)Vc(J).
The proof of this theorem is analogous to the proof of Theorem 17.
A.3 Proofs
In this section, we give the full proofs for the theoretical results presented in the paper.
Lemma 7 (Properties of SOS). For every r and S, CROS(S, r) satisfies the following:
(i) The restriction σ|G(S) of any σ ∈ CROS(S, r) is a NE in G(S, r).
(ii) For fully mixed r, any NE in G(S, r) extends into a CROS(S, r) strategy.
(iii) CROS(S, r) is non-empty.
Proof. (i): Suppose that a restriction of some σ is not a NE in G(S, r). Since the game starts by a
chance node, there must be some chance action ah at the root s.t. one of the players can change their
action at Ip(h) or at one of the infosets below it. This is equivalent to V σp (Ip(h)) not being equal to
max{V
σ′p,σ−p
p (Ip(h)) | σ′p ∈ Σp}, and thus σ doesn’t belong to CROS(S, r).
(ii): This follows from the fact that the root utility inG(S, r) is equal to
∑
I∈Ip(S)
ησ(root, I)V σp (I),
which can further be rewritten as
∑
I∈Ip(S)
ησ(I)
ησ(S V
σ
p (I) (where σ the G(S, r) strategy extended in
a way that is compatible with r). If the strategy σ is fully mixed above S, each of the fractions is
non-zero, and each of the V σp (I)-s has to be maximal.
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(iii): Let µ be a strategy satisfying rngµ(S) = r. For n ∈ N, denote by µt the fully mixed strategy
defined as µt(I, a) := (1− 1
n
)µ(I, a)+ 1
n
1
|A(I)| and by r
n the corresponding range at S. Moreover,
let ρn be some NE ofG(S, rn) and denote by σn the strategy obtained by replacing µn by σn in the
subgameG(S).
Since the space of strategies is compact, we can select a sub-sequence (σnk )k∈N that converges
to some σ ∈ Σ (to simplify the notation, we assume that nk = k, so σn → σ). We shall prove
that σ ∈ CROS(S, r). Firstly, we have rngσ(S) = r since µn coincides with σn above S (and
we have µn → µ and rngµ(S) = r. Moreover, each σn belongs to CROS(S, rn) by (ii), so we
have V σ
n
p (I) = max{V
σ′p,σ
n
−p
p (Ip(h)) | σ′p ∈ Σp}. Since the function V
(·)
p (I) is continuous in
the strategy parameter, we get V σp (I) = max{V
σ′p,σ−p
p (Ip(h)) | σ′p ∈ Σp}, which concludes the
proof.
Proposition 10 (Approximating V µ,∗c,p by a neural net). Let r be a range at S ∈ S and p ∈ {1, 2}.
If V and V ′ are two mappings satisfying Eq. (3), then so does their convex combination W =
λV + (1− λ)V ′ for any λ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Recall that a counterfactual best-response of player 1 to σ is a strategy satisfying
V
CBR1(σ2),σ2
1,c (I) = maxσ′p V
σ′p,σ2
1,c (I) Note that the conclusion of the proposition isn’t trivial since
a convex combination of cf. values λV σ
′
p,c + (1− λ)V
σ′′
p,c typically isn’t equal to V
λσ′+(1−λ)σ′′
p,c .
Firstly, observe that any pair (W1, σ2) satisfies “σ2 ∈ Σ2 is a part of NE and W1(I) =
V
CBR1(σ2),σ2
1,c (I) for each I ∈ I1” if and only if (W1, r2(σ2)) is a solution to the sequence form dual
linear program (LP) (see [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008, (5.10-5.13)]), where r2(σ2) denotes
the realization plan corresponding to σ2. (The NE part is proven in [Shoham and Leyton-Brown,
2008]. The CBR part easily follows from [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008, (5.10-5.11)] by back-
ward induction.)
Denote by (C) the constraint “a realization plan coincides with r2(σ) outside of G(S)”. It follows
that a vectorW satisfies Eq. (3) if and only if there is some strategy σ for which (W1, r2(σ)) is a
solution of the LP (5.10-5.14)&(C), and analogously for (W2, r1(σ)).
Let λ ∈ (0, 1), V ′, V ′′ be as in the proposition, and let σ′ be s.t. V ′p(I) = V
CBRp(σ
′
−i),σ
′
−i
p (I) for
each I ∈ Sˆ(i). Denoting V ′p(I) := V
CBRp(σ
′
−i),σ
′
−i
p (I) for all I , we have that the pair (V ′1 , r2(σ
′))
is a solution to (5.10− 5.14) & (C). The same will then hold for V ′′ and (the analogously defined)
σ′′. Since the space of all solutions of an LP is convex, the pair (λV ′1 + (1− λ)V
′′
1 , λr2(σ
′) + (1−
λ)r2(σ
′′)) is also a solution to this LP. Since V1 = λV ′1 + (1− λ)V
′′
1 , the same holds for V1. Since
an analogous result is true for V2, the observation we made earlier implies that V is a valid output
for the SolveSubgamemethod.
Proposition 11 (Infoset aggregation reduces ambiguity). If σ, µ ∈ CROS(S, r) satisfy σ−p = µ−p,
then we have V σp (I) = V
µ
p (I) and V
σ
p,c(I) = V
µ
p,c(I) = V
CBRp(σ−p),σ−p
p,c (I) for each I ∈ I
aug
p (S).
Proof. By definition of SOS, σ has to satisfy V σp (I) = maxσ′p V
σ′p,σ−p
p (I) for each I ∈ I
aug
p (S),
and analogous formula holds for µ. Since σ−p = µ−p, we get the first part of the proposition. By def-
inition of CBR, we have V CBRp(σ−p),σ−pp,c (I) = maxσ′p V
σ′p,σ−p
p,c (I). Since V
(·)
p,c (I) = η
(·)
p (I)V
(·)
p (I),
we get the second part as well.
Example 13. CROS(S, r) strategies that have the same range can still have different history values.
Proof. This can be witnessed on simple one-player game (Figure 2, left), where the root is a chance
node with two actions A, B and uniform strategy, where the following two nodes belong to the
same I ∈ Ip and have actions L, R. The utilities are 0, 1 for AL, AR and 1, 0 for BL, BR. Any
strategy in this game is an equilibrium with counterfactual value V σ1,c(I) = 0.5, but any σ 6= ν
will have different expected utilities and counterfactual values for histories (i.e. vσ1,c(A) 6= v
ν
1,c(A),
vσ1,c(A) 6= v
ν
1,c(A), and likewise for B).
13
Theorem 12 (Values depend on whole ranges). Let G be an EFG, S ∈ S a common-knowledge
public state4, h0 ∈ S, and r a joint range at S. Assume that S isn’t thick and r is fully mixed5. Then
for each g ∈ S, there is r′ that only differs from r at g, and an EFG G˜ which only differs from G
below S, s.t. {vσ1 (h0) | σ ∈ C˜ROS(S, r)} 6= {v
σ
1 (h0) | σ ∈ C˜ROS(S, r
′)}.
Proof. Let G, S, h0, r and g be as in Theorem 12. We set r′(g) := 0 (and r′(h) := r(h) for h 6= g).
We shall prove the theorem by constructing G˜ and showing that it has the desired properties.
We start by making two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that each h ∈ S only has one
legal (dummy) action that we denote d. In the general case, each ha, hb would be extended in the
identical manner, complicating the notation, but not introducing any actual challenges. Since the
public state cannot be further refined, there exists a sequence of histories satisfying h0 ∼ h1 ∼
· · · ∼ hn = g in S. We assume that hp 6= hj for i 6= j. We only show the proof in the case where
both h0, h1 and hn−1, hn are indistinguishable by the first player (the proofs of the remaining three
cases are similar). (Note that the proof actually only requires the range to be non-zero on each of
the histories hp, rather than on the whole S.)
The game G˜ is identical to G at (H \ G(S)) ∪ S, and is defined as follows at {hd | h ∈ S} and
below:
• For h ∈ S \ {hp | i = 0, . . . , n}, hd is a terminal node with utility 0 (for all strategic
considerations, this replaces S by {hp | i = 0, . . . , n}).
• For hp, i = 0, . . . , n − 1, hpd leads to a matching pennies game (a matrix game with
actions U , D for player 1, actions L, R for player 2, and corresponding utilities 1 for U,L
andD,R, resp. 0 for U,R andD,L).
• For hn, hnd leads to a game where only player 1 acts, choosing between U (utility 0) and
D (utility 1).
• The information sets below hp are defined in such a way that player 1 has to use the same
strategy below h0 and h1, h2 and h3, . . . , hn−1 and hn, and player 2 has to use the same
strategy below h1 and h2, h3 and h4, . . . , hn−2 and hn−1 (player 2 strategy below h0 is
independent of everything else).
Since hn is unreachable under r′, G˜(S, r′) is effectively a collection of (interconnected) matching
pennies games. It follows that the uniform strategy of both players is a Nash equilibrium (clearly, no
player can improve his overall utility). On the other hand, it is not a NE strategy in G˜(S, r) (since
player 1 could improve his utility be deviating to “D everywhere”).
In particular, 0.5 is an expected utility of h0 under some NE strategy in G˜(S, r′). Suppose that some
NE strategy σ in G˜(S, r) has vσ1 (h0) = 0.5. We will show that such σ has to be uniformly random,
and thus prove the theorem by contradiction.
Firstly, if σ1 wasn’t uniformly random at the information set {h0d, h1d}, player 2 could increase his
overall utility by changing his strategy below h0 to either L or R, and thus σ wouldn’t be a NE.
We proceed inductively. We know that uσ1 (h0) = 0.5, and that in {h0d, h1d}, σ1 takes both U and
D with non-zero probability. If σ1 is to be a NE, player 1 has to be indifferent between playing U
andD in {h0d, h1d}. Since vσ1 (h0) = 0.5, this can only be achieved if σ2 takes both L andR below
h1 with the same probability. In particular, uσ1 (h1) = 0.5. Since G˜ forces the strategy of player 2 to
be the same below h1 and h2, we get that σ2 is uniformly random below h2 as well.
We repeat the argument above for each hp, eventually showing that if the players are to be indifferent
between the actions they take with non-zero probability, σ1 has to be uniformly random in the whole
G˜(S) and σ2 has to be uniformly random below h1, . . . , hn−1. Finally, if σ1 wasn’t uniform below
4The common-knowledge public states, defined by [Šustr et al., 2019] as the equivalence classes of ∼, are
public states that cannot be further split into smaller ones.
5That is, r(h) > 0 holds for each h ∈ S.
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Figure 3: An example of a game G˜ used in the proof of Theorem 12.
A
0 1
B
1 0 IA
IB
0 1 1 0
Pf
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A B
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A B
Figure 4: Games where different equilibria produce different expected utilities (left) and information-
set values (right). The chance strategies are uniform. (Repeated from the main text.)
h0 (but was below h1), player 1 could increase his utility by deviating to either U orD. This implies
that the whole σ is uniformly random, which contradicts our earlier observation.
Example 15. Suppose that trunk strategies σ and σ′ can both be extended into NE in the full game
and V σ,∗p is an optimal value function for σ. Then V
σ,∗
p might not be optimal for σ
′.
Proof. Indeed, consider G from the right side of Figure 4: first to act is the player 2, who decides
between preparing for A (PfA) and B (PfB). A chance outcome then randomly (50:50) chooses
which of the options A and B actually comes to pass. Finally, player 1 has a dummy action6 where
he observes the chance outcome, but not the action of player 2. Player 1 then receives 0 utility if
player 2 guessed the chance event correctly and 1 utility if he guessed incorrectly. The structure
of the game implies that any strategy of player 2 is optimal. Moreover, we have V σ1 (I) 6= V
σ′
1 (I)
whenever σ2 and σ′2 are distinct.
6While the actions of player 1 are irrelevant in G, one can easily modify it such that the inclusion of player
1 is meaningful.
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